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ABSTRACT
Changes of theories are major events in science. Two main types of questions may be asked about 
them: i) how do scientists choose new theories?, and ii) how is consensus formed? Generally, philos-
ophers do not distinguish these two questions. Kuhn, on the contrary, offers very different answers to 
each of these questions. Theory-choice, on the one hand, is explained through the application of epis-
temic criteria, such as accuracy and consistency; nonetheless, because these values do not prescribe a 
single choice, consensus formation, on the other hand, is explained through a series of socio-epistemic 
mechanisms, namely: scientific pedagogy, diffusion and production of knowledge within the community 
(the “wave motion”), and restructuring of the scientific field. These mechanisms are the basis of Kuhn’s 
social epistemology, in that they are not restricted to sociology nor epistemology, encompassing both 
social interactions and epistemic evaluations of theories.
Keywords: Thomas Kuhn, consensus formation, social epistemology.
RESUMO 
Mudanças de teorias são eventos centrais na ciência. Dois tipos principais de perguntas podem ser 
feitas em relação a eles: i) como os cientistas escolhem novas teorias? e ii) como o consenso é for-
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mado? A maior parte dos filósofos não costuma distinguir estas duas questões. Kuhn, entretanto, 
oferece respostas muito diferentes para cada uma delas. A escolha de teoria é explicada, por ele, 
por meio da aplicação de critérios epistêmicos, como precisão e consistência. O fato de que esses 
valores não prescrevem uma única escolha, contudo, leva-o a explicar a formação de consenso por 
meio de uma série de mecanismos socioepistêmicos, a saber: a pedagogia científica; a difusão e 
produção de conhecimento dentro da comunidade (o “movimento das ondas”); e a reestruturação 
do campo científico. Esses mecanismos são a base da epistemologia social de Kuhn, na medida em 
que não se restringem nem à sociologia nem à epistemologia, envolvendo tanto interações sociais 
como avaliações epistêmicas de teorias.
Palavras-chave: Thomas Kuhn, formação de consenso, epistemologia social.
Introduction
The acceptance of a new theory is always a major happening in science. Not surprisingly then, phi-
losophers have long been concerned with explaining such events. At least two main types of questions 
may be involved in this task. One is a question regarding the individuals that participate in the contro-
versy—“why did scientist S choose theory T?” The second is a problem regarding the community as a 
whole—“how was scientific consensus around theory T formed?” The former may be referred to as the 
problem of theory-choice and the latter as the problem of consensus formation.
These two questions are often viewed as the same by philosophers, or at least as being connected 
in such a way that they end up receiving similar answers. The underpinning reasoning goes as follows: 
provided that scientists act rationally, then the reasons that explain their choices should also be the 
reasons that explain why they all agree. Thus, the answer to the question of why scientists prefer one 
theory to another is simultaneously taken as an answer to the question of why a theory is accepted by 
the whole community.
Here, I want to explore Kuhn’s answers to these two problems. Let me start with the first of them: 
how does Kuhn respond to the theory-choice problem? According to him, scientists choose theo-
ries based on a set of values, such as accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity, and fruitfulness, which 
are characteristic of science and conveyed by more experient members of the community through 
practical contexts. Therefore, Kuhn gives a standard and straightforward answer to the problem of 
theory-choice: scientists choose theories based on a set of epistemic values (see, for example, 1962, 
1970a, 1977a, 1983a).
However, Kuhn also states that, because scientists have different personal and professional experiences, 
they may end up applying values differently in concrete cases (1977a, 1983a). In other words, the nature of 
values is such that equally competent researchers in possession of the same body of evidence may achieve 
distinct conclusions about what is the best theory in a field (for a more extensive discussion on Kuhn’s theory 
of rational choice, see Pirozelli, 2019). I refer to this as Kuhn’s thesis of the variability of values.
As a consequence, such variability of values produces a cleavage between individual-level ques-
tions and community-level ones. The epistemic merits of a theory T are the main reason of why a scien-
tist S chooses it, but since individuals may disagree on what these merits are, these epistemic values are 
not sufficient to explain a consensus around T. Hence, the theory-choice problem and the problem of 
consensus formation do not receive the same answer from Kuhn.
For many philosophers, Kuhn’s thesis of the variability of values seemed unacceptable (Scheffler, 1982; 
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Shapere, 1964; Laudan, 1985; Lakatos, 1970).1 The reason was simple. If epistemic criteria do not necessar-
ily lead all scientists to the same conclusion, then, it was assumed, values would be irrelevant to explain 
the outcome of scientific debate, and agreement would have to come from some non-epistemic source. 
These would be precisely the factors pointed out by Kuhn as responsible for determining differences in 
the application of values—elements such as age, institutional position and political-ideological prefer-
ence. Thus, community cohesion would be promoted by circumstances regardless of any relation to the 
quality of the theories in dispute. Not only would the problem of theory-choice and consensus formation 
receive a different answer, but also the answer to these problems would not necessarily be related.
Curiously enough, Kuhn (1992) believed that a similar reasoning supported the Strong Pro-
gramme—a school that, in most aspects, was diametrically opposed to most of the philosophers who 
were so critical of him. For the Strong Programme, if values did not lead to a single choice by all scien-
tists, it was because such values did not have a real epistemic function, and thus did not lend themselves 
to determining the outcome of disputes. And if that was true, then we should look somewhere else in 
order to explain the resolution of scientific debates—to things like interests, financial support, and all 
sorts of social factors. At best, the appeal to epistemic values would be a psychological resource effi-
ciently manipulated by scientists, or as one of Kuhn’s most forceful critics argued, “a mere interplay of 
rhetorical effects” (Scheffler, 1982, p. 79).
For both sides, the inevitable implication of Kuhn’s thesis of the variability of values was the re-
placement of epistemology by sociology. Epistemic values could perhaps be relevant to explain the-
ory-choice, but they would be mostly useless in explaining consensus formation. Since values do not 
determine a universal choice, consensus formation would be explained by non-epistemic factors. What 
differentiated the Strong Programme’s view from the position of more traditional philosophers was sim-
ply their stance regarding this relativistic conclusion (Kuhn, 1992). Whereas his more traditional critics 
mourned the abandonment of epistemological considerations, social constructivists praised, for the 
same reason, the emergence of social studies.
Kuhn always rejected this interpretation of his work. He insisted that he never took social factors to 
be the driving force of scientific development, stressing the role of epistemic values for the resolution 
of scientific controversies. However, we may ask: if values may be differently applied by scientists, what 
is their function in explaining consensus after all? And how is consensus formed?
The rest of this article intends to examine Kuhn’s answer to the second problem concerning scientif-
ic changes—the problem of consensus formation. As it will become clear, Kuhn explains consensus for-
mation through a series of socio-epistemic mechanisms, namely: scientific pedagogy, the wave motion, 
and the restructuring of the scientific fields. After discussing those mechanisms in detail, I will explain 
what makes them not only social, but also socio-epistemic mechanisms.
Dominance
According to a common interpretation of Kuhn’s remarks, values would weaken the power of epis-
temological considerations to produce consensus. If values cannot prescribe a single choice, then they 
cannot provide the necessary agreement that science depends on.
This reasoning, however, is based on a particular premise in that scientists who employ values dif-
ferently will necessarily achieve incompatible conclusions. Contrary to that, though, Kuhn believes that 
distinct applications of values may still lead to similar preferences. “Individual scientists,” he claims, 
“embrace a new paradigm for all sorts of reasons” (1962, p. 151). This can be better explained through 
the notion of “dominance”.
1 Kuhn himself was aware that “this characteristic of the operation of shared values has seemed a major weakness of my position” 
(1970a, p. 185).
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A theory T is said dominant if it “is superior to all its extant rivals by every extant set of standards 
utilized in that field” (Laudan & Laudan, 1989, p. 225). Put differently, a theory T is dominant if, despite 
the fact that scientists apply values differently, they all agree that T is better than its rivals.2
The possibility that one theory is dominant might explain why scientists who employ values in dif-
ferent ways do not have to (rationally) disagree on which theory is superior. In case a theory T dominates 
its competitors, individuals may all accept T (and we expect rational scientists will), despite differing on 
how they evaluate theories. In virtue of such dominance, epistemic values may possess a function in 
giving an answer to the problem of consensus formation.
In fact, dominance not just blocks the relativistic consequences of the variability of values, giving 
epistemic values a place in explaining consensus. In theory, if a dominant theory exists, consensus for-
mation could be explained solely through epistemic considerations. Nonetheless, dominance alone 
is probably insufficient to generate consensus within a community. First, it seems unlikely that we find 
actual cases of dominance in science. After all, assuming that scientists evaluate theories in their own 
manner, it is hard to imagine that the whole community reaches the same judgment. Dominance, in 
other words, sounds like an unachievable demand, in requiring that all members of the community 
agree on which theory to choose. More importantly, dominance by itself establishes only the possibility 
of consensus in the face of divergent evaluations, saying nothing about its effective accomplishment. It 
is still necessary to indicate how the emergence and disappearance of dominant theories actually occur.
Dominance is, thus, a sort of statics of consensus, establishing in which cases a rational, epi-
stemic-based consensus is possible. For this reason, it must be complemented by a dynamics of con-
sensus, which explains how dominance can arise and be undermined. This dynamics constitute the core 
of Kuhn’s solution to the problem of consensus formation. It is constituted by three socio-epistemic 
mechanisms that can be found in his model of scientific development: scientific pedagogy, the wave 
motion, and the restructuring of the scientific field.
Scientific pedagogy
The thesis of the variability of values affirms that values may be differently applied by scientists. 
We must be careful, though, not to overestimate the underdetermination of these criteria. That values 
can be applied differently does not mean that “they may be judged arbitrarily” (Kuhn, 1970b, p. 158). In 
practice, for Kuhn, the application of values is highly determined.
As Kuhn likes to emphasize, the shared components of scientific practice (among which epistemic 
values can be found) are transmitted through “a narrow and rigid education, probably more so than 
any other except perhaps in orthodox theology” (1962, p. 165). This uncritical socialization process has 
crucial consequences for many aspects of scientific practice. It is, for instance, what allows the esoteric 
character of normal science, directing scientists’ attention to certain aspects of nature.
Scientific pedagogy also leaves strong marks in the application of values. Particularly, it counter-
balances the possible openness of epistemic criteria. This socialization process homogenizes scientists’ 
assessments and reduces the scope of acceptable applications of values. Individuals with a similar back-
ground—who went to the same schools, read the same literature, and performed similar experiments—
tend to incorporate scientific practice in a relatively similar manner, and consequently, apply values in 
close ways.
Scientific pedagogy works, therefore, as an important normalizing mechanism, especially in the 
aftermath of a revolution. On the one hand, it reduces possible sources of divergence, engendering 
2 This can be considered as a social notion of dominance—i.e., the theory is dominant in case all scientists consider it better than the 
other options available. There can also be an individual notion of dominance, as in D’Agostino (2005). A theory is then said to be dom-
inant in case it is better in every aspect for a particular scientist, i.e., according to all the different values used in evaluating theories.
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a relative homogeneity in the community; on the other, it spreads and reinforces the already existing 
agreement within the community. When it comes to considering science over time, pedagogy is partic-
ularly effective, as an intergenerational procedure to bury controversies once and for all.
The wave motion
Rigorously speaking, scientific pedagogy is more of a maintainer of consensus than one of its produc-
ers. Surely, by reducing disagreement, it extends and strengthens consensus. But it does not create con-
sensus in case the community is divided—it is only when things are more stable that it acts. The next two 
mechanisms are more appropriately mechanisms for consensus formation. The first of them is the process 
of progressive adherence to a theory, which D’Agostino (2010) calls the “wave-model.” I use the expres-
sion “wave motion,” instead, in order to emphasize its actual role in the dynamics of consensus building.
The wave motion can be described as follows. Convinced of the superiority of a new theory, a 
few pioneering scientists decide to adopt it.3 While the majority of scientists stay faithful to the older 
approach, the adepts of the new theory start working under this new approach. If they are successful, 
they will produce arguments and evidence that favor this position. Consequently, other scientists in the 
community may lean towards the more recent approach.
These other scientists will then develop the new theory along with the first adepts. Again, if the 
group can produce significant contributions, they may convince more and more people of the quality of 
the new theory. With more evidence, the preference of yet other scientists may change towards the new 
theory. Over time, the transfer of adherence spreads through the community. The process stops when 
all scientists come to accept the new theory. In the end, what was once a neglected alternative becomes 
a consensus (Kuhn, 1962, ch. 12).
Two aspects stand out in the wave motion. First, this mechanism assumes that the factors that lead 
to the progressive acceptance of a theory by scientists are epistemic considerations. The only element 
responsible for the change of opinion by scientists is the improvement or worsening of theories accord-
ing to epistemic values. For Kuhn, the production of evidence that results in changes of evaluation is 
the main factor involved in the acceptance of a theory. For him, those values are “the shared basis for 
theory choice” (1977a, p. 322).4
Second, the wave motion mechanism depends on the differing impact of arguments and evidence 
on the various theories. Otherwise, comparative assessments would remain stable, and no change 
would occur in scientists’ preference. For a comparative evaluation—and evaluation is always compar-
ative for Kuhn (see, for example, 1962, ch. 12; 1992)—, it would be as if the evidence did not exist (even 
if it is relevant to other purposes, such as a better empirical adequacy of the theory). This is perhaps 




), then “the occurrence of E can never change the 
preference rating between the two competing theories” (Salmon, 1990, p. 192).
Another notable aspect of the wave motion mechanism is its temporal dimension, absent from 
the notion of dominance. “Rather than a single group conversion,” Kuhn claims, “what occurs is an 
increasing shift in the distribution of professional allegiances” (1962, p. 157). This happens because new 
evidence and arguments for theories are produced by scientists as part of their work. Because of that, 
consensus and dissent do not remain static. As evidence and arguments are generated, scientists’ pref-
erences may change. Without this, assessments would remain the same indefinitely.
The change in evidential content, however, does not explain the gradual aspect of the wave mo-
3 I speak here of a controversy as the dispute between an old and a new theory, since this is usually taken as the paradigmatic case 
of theory-choice. But the dynamics of consensus formation is supposed to be the same for other situations, e.g. when there are 
more than two theories involved or when rival theories are born together. 
4 This does not mean that non-epistemic factors never influence scientists’ opinions. They do, but mainly indirectly, by influencing 
the application of values, and not the result in itself. See Pirozelli, 2019.
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tion—i.e., the fact that transitions are usually made piecemeal. Instead, the gradual character of the 
wave motion is explained by the variability in the application of values. In a community where scientists 
held identical appreciations, scientists would all accept the same theory. Hence, we would have the 
whole community changing all at once in a single flow of adhesion, or there would be no change at all 
(Kitcher, 1990, ch. 8).
But while variability in evaluation formulas is a necessary requirement, it is not sufficient to guaran-
tee the temporal spread of change. Strong evidence could, in fact, impact all the defenders of the old 
theory in such a way that they would be convinced immediately, despite applying values differently. In 
other words, nothing guarantees that all of a sudden the community will not move to a new theory.
In spite of being a theoretical possibility, Kuhn believes this situation is unlikely. In practice, he 
thinks, the acceptance of a new theory tends to occur in stages (wherefrom the idea of “wave” comes), 
with the gradual growth in the number of supporters. Given what we said about scientists’ assessments, 
this dynamic sounds more plausible. With countless values at stake, distinct ways of applying them, 
and many forms of incommensurability operating, the impact of evidence and arguments on the whole 
community tends to be limited, and their role more ambiguous.
Evidence is always open to interpretation and, therefore, insufficient to convince all scientists that 
one theory is superior to the others. What for an individual may seem evidence that considerably favors 
a theory, for another may seem irrelevant; still, another scientist may consider it as counting against the 
theory and still others may find that such “evidence” is not even real. In sum, there is no single way to 
evaluate theories, especially when it comes to scientific debates. Scientists’ decisions are often taken 
“on the basis of significantly more equivocal evidence” (1977a, p. 327)—as if there were “non-equivocal 
evidence”. Thus, in order to understand the change in the acceptance of theories in the community it is 
not enough to know their original assessments. It is also necessary to know how, for each of them, the 
arguments and evidence presented are interpreted and weighed. 
On the other hand, Kuhn does not discard the possibility that groups of scientists may change all 
together. In fact, this is expected, knowing that the socialization processes scientists go through may 
be quite similar. As said before, scientific pedagogy tends to produce a certain homogeneity in the way 
scientists evaluate theories. In addition, the scientists participating in a controversy may be subject to 
similar conditions, or have certain specific personality traits that make them behave similarly. In the early 
stages of a controversy, for instance, some individuals may be attracted by aesthetic considerations “in 
defiance of the evidence provided by problem-solving” (Kuhn, 1962, p. 156).5
One last aspect we may consider regarding the wave motion mechanism concerns the time it takes. 
No simple answer is available in this case, though. Controversies can be resolved almost instantly, or 
drag on for years, decades or even centuries. It all depends on how different scientists’ evaluation for-
mulas are, how fast new evidence is produced, and how much force the pieces of evidence exert on 
scientists’ evaluations.
Restructuring of the scientific field
The wave motion describes one of the fundamental mechanisms for consensus formation—the 
process of increasing adherence to a theory motivated by the results of the research undertaken by 
scientists. Some circumstances, nonetheless, may limit this process and hinder the reorganization of the 
community around a single theory. Among such circumstances, the most important one is the high vari-
ability in evaluation formulas: the larger the number of people involved in the dispute and the looser the 
socialization processes are in the community, the more difficult it is for all of them to accept the theory.
5 Sarkar (2007, ch. 6) and Wray (2011, ch. 11) advance a typology of the groups accepting a new theory.
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Because of that, the wave motion may be unable to create a consensus within the community. Some 
individuals may remain indefinitely faithful to the older approach, despite evidence produced in favor 
of the new theory. Their evaluation formulas may be so unfavorable to the new approach that they may 
never come to accept the new theory, regardless of any findings or evidence produced. Episodes such 
as Priestley’s rejection of the oxygen theory illustrates well how some scientists may remain resolute 
in their theoretical choices, notwithstanding the adherence of most of their peers to the new theory. 
“There are always some men who cling to one or another of the older views,” Kuhn says (1962, p. 19; see 
also 1962, p. 158). The wave motion may not engender an absolute consensus after all.
If the wave motion mechanism will be able to create a consensus or not within the community is 
ultimately an empirical and contingent matter. By definition, all rational scientists set a positive value on 
evidence. Hence, in the limit, the uninterrupted production of evidence in favor of a theory must lead to 
its acceptance by all members of the community. In reality, though, scientists evaluate values differently 
and, for some individuals, no evidence or argument will change their preferences. Moreover, depend-
ing on the theoretical beliefs of a scientist, the new data may not even be considered as legitimate 
evidence. There is no perspective, then, that certain scientists will be convinced of the superiority of the 
new theory in a reasonable span of time. Given the limitation in time that scientific activity is subject to, 
an actual barrier to the wave motion may exist.
We must now ask: if a part of the community remains attached to the old theory, despite the adher-
ence of the rest of the group, how could the controversy end definitively? Other than the wave motion, 
what else could generate consensus within a community in which part of the members is not convinced 
of the effectiveness of the new theory?
Kuhn’s answer is that the final settlement of this controversy may depend on changes in the struc-
ture of the community. In case some members resist accepting the new theory, a consensus will require 
the creation and modification of the boundaries in the research field; more specifically, a change in the 
population of scientists in the community. Replacing one theory with another often implies a corre-
sponding change in the composition and structure of the community. “The new paradigm,” for Kuhn, 
“implies a new and more rigid definition of the field” (1962, p. 19).
Such a social restructuring has two prototypical forms (Wray, 2011, Part II; Hoyningen-Huene, 1993, 
p. 154)—the marginalization of resistant members (Kuhn, 1962, p. 158) and the formation of new spe-
cialties (Kuhn, 1991, 1992).
Marginalization of resistant members
The first type of community restructuring is the marginalization of resistant members. Divergence 
among scientists is expected during certain periods of scientific activity, especially when some of the 
theories at stake have a revolutionary potential. Scientists will dispute over the merits of theories, setting 
off a wave motion process. The supporters of each group will try to convince their opponents, through 
arguments and evidence, of the superiority of their position
At some point, however, when almost the whole community moves towards the new approach, 
scientists may come to consider that the efforts devoted to demonstrating the superiority of the new 
theory are more than enough, and additional actions for this aim represent a waste of energy. For all 
purposes, they consider that the controversy is over. From then on, the disagreement expressed by the 
unconvinced scientists, which seemed legitimate before, may start to be seen as unjustifiable obstina-
cy—or, at least, as something that would no longer be worth insisting on.
The perception that some scientists go beyond what is reasonable in their attempt to rehabilitate 
a defeated theory—in the view, of course, of the majority of the community—causes reactions in the 
relationship between the two groups. Scientists who accept the new theory stop debating with their 
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opponents, and prioritize dialogue and collaboration with individuals who already share the same the-
oretical preferences.
Deliberately or not, the adepts of new theory begin to build their own institutional networks and 
communication channels, from which the adepts of the older theory are excluded. The individuals who 
remain irresolute in defending a position considered outdated are progressively put aside by the rest 
of the community. Their research acquires a peculiar character, their publications no longer appear in 
the same journals (if they are ever published at all), their presence in events decreases, their articles are 
less cited, and exchanges with other scientists become less intense. In the end, these scientists become 
isolated from the rest of the community.
The marginalization of resistant members can be more formally explained. The initial situation is 
a stage of division inside the community, with some scientists accepting T
1
 and others endorsing T
2
. 
A debate then follows, in which case a wave motion process may unfold. At some point, though, the 
division between those scientists for whom theory T
1
 dominates its adversaries, N, and those for whom 
it does not, ¬N, stabilizes—with N being much larger than ¬N. With the marginalization of the resistant 
members, the old community, formed by both groups,
J = N ∪ ¬N
becomes more restricted. The set ¬N is eliminated, and the community becomes simply
J = N
Scientists who do not accept the theory are—in practice, if not formally—excluded from the com-
munity. (Figure 1)
What happens to the adepts of an older theory? Kuhn says that they are “simply read out of the 
profession, which thereafter ignores their work” (Kuhn, 1962, p. 19).
Kuhn also claims that these marginalized individuals cease to be scientists. This statement is a con-
sequence of Kuhn’s sociological definition of science. Science is understood by him as a social practice 
characterized by a specific set of values (1983a). The same is true for his concepts of scientific communi-
ty—“the practitioners of a scientific specialty” (1970a, p. 176)—and scientist—the participant in a com-
munity characterized by certain practices and values. Ultimately, this whole set of notions is understood 
by him in a sociological character.
Almost by definition, then, an individual who does not accept the theory endorsed by most of the 
community and does not properly contribute to the current research—through conversations, texts, and 
research papers—ceases to be a scientist de facto. The social exclusion of an individual from a scientific 
community is tantamount to the withdrawal of his/her status as a scientist.
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Interestingly, though, this sociological definition of scientific practice implies that the early support-
ers of a theory—that is, those who accept it when most of the community still remains attached to the 
older paradigm—are not, in this sense, scientists tout court, either. Sarkar (2007) had already observed 
this aspect of the Kuhnian definition of science:
Kuhn failed to see a troubling argument by symmetry. If Lavoisier favored the oxygen hypothesis, 
when his entire profession had not, should he not then be regarded as having ceased to be scientific, 
too, the late success of the group notwithstanding? (Sarkar, 2007, p. 152, n. 39).
The only response that can be given to the symmetry pointed out by Sarkar, consistent with Kuhn’s 
sociological position, is to recognize that as much as those who resist a new theory for too long cease 
to be, in the strict sense, scientists, those who accept it promptly, before everyone else does, are in the 
same way separated from the scientific community. 
Lavoisier’s case, however, demonstrates that such marginalization need not be definitive. The ox-
ygen theory represented an original theoretical approach at the time. So, at least for a while, Lavoisier 
was relatively isolated from the rest of his community. Over time, though, he was able to produce solu-
tions to problems that seemed intriguing to his fellow chemists, amassing evidence that drew other 
scientists towards his approach. It was only then that Lavoisier rejoined the group of chemists—having 
in the meantime reconstructed extensive areas of this discipline (Holmes, 2000).
Disciplinary change
The second prototypical model of communitarian restructuring is disciplinary change. The margin-
alization of resistant community members is an extremely efficient mechanism of consensus production 
when the wave motion process exhausts its potential. Its functioning, however, seems to depend on 
whether the wave motion results in an almost complete agreement—which is, then, completed with the 
exclusion of the few remaining scientists.
Science, however, would not be very efficient if the resolution of theoretical disputes always de-
manded the exclusion of substantial portions of the community contrary to a new theory. When the 
number of adepts of an old theory remains high, another mechanism comes into action—disciplinary 
change, a split in the group that practices a particular scientific specialty. “The reception of a new par-
adigm,” Kuhn alerts, “often necessitates a redefinition of the corresponding science” (1962, p. 103).
There are three types of disciplinary change resulting from the acceptance of a new theory. The first 
is when the population remains relatively stable, and the only change occurs at the conceptual level, 
with one theory succeeding another. This is what Kuhn (1962) calls “scientific revolution.” (Figure 2)
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In a revolution, a new theory simply replaces an older one, and the community remains substan-
tially the same. This kind of development is linked to an effective wave motion. This does not mean, of 
course, that all scientists accepted the new theory, as the marginalization of resistant members makes 
it clear. Nonetheless, if few scientists remain attached to the defeated theory, their exclusion does not 
seriously damage the community’s structure. The result is then, on the one hand, a single community 
reorganized around a new theory, and on the other hand, an amorphous group of individuals without a 
strong disciplinary affiliation.
The second pattern of development is that in which a community splits into two. This is what Kuhn 
calls “speciation” (Figure 3).
In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, as the book’s own title makes clear, Kuhn saw the revo-
lutionary substitution of theories as the “usual developmental pattern of mature science” (1962, p. 12). 
Later, Kuhn started to see in speciation the general mechanism of scientific development. “The biolog-
ical parallel to revolutionary change,” he defended, “is not mutation, as I thought for many years, but 
speciation” (1991, p. 98). Speciation not only generates new scientific specialties, but also whole new 
areas of science (Marcum, 2018).
In the case of speciation, the conceptual division within the community causes a fragmentation 
of the research community itself. There may be two reasons why a community divides. First, the 
wave motion may not be very effective, being unable to direct all the members of the community 
towards the same alternative. The only solution, then, is to pursue the different approaches sepa-
rately. Second, part of the community may decide to explore a new lexicon for conceptual reasons 
(Wray, 2005). According to Kuhn, new theories are often only successful at dealing with a narrow set 
of problems (1991, 1993). Some of the scientists, then, may choose to investigate the implications 
of the new taxonomy further, while others remain under the regime of the older theory. That division 
is reinforced by communication problems caused by the incommensurability of lexicons. Specific 
social factors—as the availability of funding—may also provide additional stimulus to the creation 
of new specialties.
Finally, we can consider a third sort of developmental pattern, which I refer to as “overlapping” 
(Figure 4). Overlapping is the situation in which “a new specialty has been born at an area of apparent 
overlapping between two preexisting specialties, as what occurred, for example, in the cases of physical 
chemistry and molecular biology” (Kuhn, 1991, p. 97).
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The structural parallelism between theories and communities is more uncertain in the case of the 
creation of a new interdisciplinary field. It involves the migration of scientists from at least one of the 
previous fields, but not necessarily from all the disciplines that gave rise to the new field.
Specialization and overlapping are similar in that they are the result of the creation of a new taxon-
omy, without completely replacing the older theory. The new disciplinary field investigates a restricted 
class of problems, with which the older theory was unable to deal with (or, maybe, was not even capable 
of conceiving it).
This brief typology of types of disciplinary changes does not exhaust the subject at all. On the contrary, 
a number of problems still remain open: why does the wave motion mechanism have different results in each 
case? How do institutional factors act in the fragmentation or unification of the scientific community? What is 
the effect of these different types of dispute resolution on communication among scientists? These are just 
some of the questions raised by the disciplinary change to which Kuhn offered no answer.
The absence of consensus
We described the three basic mechanisms that lead to the formation of consensus in the com-
munity. First, scientific pedagogy, which is responsible for the transmission of values and also for 
circumscribing the disagreements among scientists. Next, the wave motion mechanism, in which 
the substitution of one theory for another is thought as a process of progressive regimentation of 
the adherents of rival theories. Finally, the restructuring of the scientific community, which elimi-
nates the remaining disagreements, putting an end to the controversy. This in turn comprises two 
sub-mechanisms: on the one hand, the marginalization of resistant members, when only a few mem-
bers are not convinced of the new theory; and on the other, disciplinary change, when dissent in-
volves a considerable part of the community. These three mechanisms have the respective functions 
in consensus building of: restricting and reinforcing agreement; decreasing dissensus; and ending 
the disagreement within the community.
However powerful they are, these mechanisms do not guarantee consensus formation. The wave 
motion mechanism may have not enough force to convince the whole community, and the restructuring 
of the scientific community may sometimes not be an option. This can happen, for instance, if scientists 
think that the controversy should be settled with a more satisfactory solution. The controversy, then, 
follows for some more time.
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In any case, regardless of the consensus building mechanisms just described, consensus may take 
some time to happen. Kuhn believed, though, that prolonged disagreements were atypical in science. 
For him, rival approaches in science are “far rarer there than in other fields; they are always in competi-
tion; and their competition is usually quickly ended” (1970a, p. 176).
Indeed, for Kuhn, the emergence of normal science may be identified with the usual absence of 
persistent controversies and the homogeneity of theoretical preferences. While there is no guarantee 
that scientific controversies will necessarily end, the history of science shows, in Kuhn’s view, that con-
sensus formation tends to occur in a relatively quick manner. The mechanisms described by him are, in 
the end, extremely effective tools for generating agreement among members of scientific communities.
The characteristics of the new consensus
By definition, consensus is the situation in which all scientists in a community hold the same 
theory. As we have seen, this may happen even when individuals possess incompatible evaluation 
formulas. What is required for such a consensus is only the dominance of a theory over its compet-
itors for some or most of the individuals, and if necessary, a process of disciplinary change to end 
the remaining disagreement.
The resulting consensus, it is important to note, is a consensus over choices, not over evaluations. 
That is, individuals may agree on the superiority of a theory, despite disagreeing as regards how they 
evaluate theories and the reasons that lead them to their choices (Hoyningen-Huene, 1993, p. 154). This 
process of consensus-building—independently of the sharing of evaluation formulas—produces what 
D’Agostino (2005) calls a “shallow agreement”—an agreement regarding results, not a deep sharing of 
fundamentals.
However, we could ask if a shallow consensus does not, inevitably, provoke an approximation of 
evaluation formulas. One hypothesis is that the individual differences that produce scientist’s evaluation 
formulas are gradually neutralized over time, generating a similarity in the way scientists evaluate theo-
ries. With time, there would be agreement not only on the choices but on the very application of values.
The hypothesis, thus, is that the convergence of choices would engender a convergence in eval-
uation formulas. We know that the conditional does not hold true for a specific moment: that two sci-
entists prefer the same theory, does not follow that their evaluation is the same. But we may wonder if 
the approximation would not happen over a longer time horizon. This can be formally expressed as the 












in which > represents the relation of “preference”. The hypothesis then states that
in which k is time and f
i
(t) is the evaluation of theory t for scientists i.
Kuhn dismisses the validity of this hypothesis. Scientists’ choices tend to become similar over time, 
but there is no reason to believe that their evaluation formulas will become any closer. Although it is 
possible, Kuhn claims, that “those algorithms themselves also become more alike with time, [...] the 
ultimate unanimity of theory choice provides no evidence whatsoever that they do so” (1977a, p. 329).
Therefore, the growing agreement regarding theoretical preference does not guarantee any 
kind of approximation in the way scientists employ epistemic values. For Kuhn, “what converges as 
the evidence changes over time need only be the values of p that individuals compute from their 
lim f
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individual algorithms” (1977a, p. 329). Nothing in the growing unanimity of opinions demands that 
the evaluation formulas become the same.
Actually, for Kuhn, the contrary is probably true: the same individual appreciations that were re-
sponsible for producing the dissent continue to be present when the community reaches a consensus. 
This is what D’Agostino (2005, p. 204) refers to as “residual divergence”—the idiosyncratic factors that 
explain the division in the community remain present when the scientists reach an agreement (Kuhn, 
1977a, p. 329).6
Conclusion
Changes of theories are major events in scientific development. Two types of questions may be 
asked about them: one concerns the reasons that lead scientists to accept a new theory; the other con-
cerns the factors that lead a community to adopt a new approach.
To the first of these problems, Kuhn gives a straightforward answer—scientists choose theories 
based on epistemic values. He also claims, however, that these values may be differently applied by sci-
entists. For this reason, such criteria cannot explain how consensus is formed in the community. Hence, 
Kuhn’s solution to the individual-level problems does not work as a solution to the second, communi-
ty-wide problem. Both problems must receive quite different answers.
Throughout this article, I intended to present Kuhn’s solution to the problem of consensus formation. 
For him, three mechanisms contribute to produce agreement within the community—scientific pedagogy, 
the wave motion, and the restructuring of the scientific field. Together, they limit the potential dispersion to 
which the variability of values is open to, and help to create a consensus around a new theory. This, I believe, 
is the essence of Kuhn’s social epistemology. Consensus, as can be seen, is produced by more than logical 
or methodological procedures—it essentially involves various sorts of social interactions.
However, claiming that its social dimension is an important part of science (and, specifically, of con-
sensus formation) is broad enough to encompass a large set of approaches—from traditional schools 
of sociology of science to the most radical versions of social constructivism. So, why asserting that this 
concern for the social dimension of science makes Kuhn a sort of social epistemologist?
I have no intention here of offering a precise definition of what social epistemology is, and how it 
differs from other related fields. In fact, it is unlikely that such a definition exists: social epistemology 
is more probably the reunion of loosely related topics, such as judgment aggregation, testimony, and 
peer disagreement (Goldman, 2011).
By stressing the social epistemological character of Kuhn’s explanation of consensus formation, I 
neither assume any rigid definition of this field, nor offer a definition of social epistemology that permits 
to distinguish it perfectly from both sociology and epistemology. Instead, what I intend to do is to stress 
the sense in which Kuhn’s epistemology is social and in which Kuhn’s sociology is epistemic.
The best way to do this, perhaps, is by addressing both terms separately. The “social” part is easier 
to grasp. By emphasizing the role of social mechanisms in resolving scientific disputes, Kuhn moves 
away from an individualistic epistemology. The fact that scientists learn theories, values, and all sets of 
scientific commitments through their peers, and the fact that scientists change their evaluations by in-
teracting with one another, point to the essential communitarian character of science and, especially, of 
scientific change. More importantly, by showing that the resolution of scientific controversies is linked to 
6 According to Kuhn, then, scientists’ evaluations do not tend to become closer to each other. The so-called risk-dispersion argu-
ment is the normative counterpart of the thesis of the variability of values. The multiplicity in evaluation formulas is positive for 
science, since it fosters the production of knowledge by spreading the risks that are inherent to any investigation, better allocating 
the limited amount of time, energy, and resources that the community possesses. As a matter of fact, a community where consen-
sus led to a conformity in judgments would be epistemically inefficient. See Kuhn, 1970b; 1970a, p. 185-86; 1977a, p. 332. See also 
D’Agostino, 2005, 2010; Kitcher, 1993, ch. 8.
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a restructuring of the scientific field, Kuhn demonstrates that “theory change is a form of social change” 
(Wray, 2011, p. 10; see also Wray, 2015, sec. 12.5).
More complicated is understanding the sense in which “epistemology” still lives in Kuhn’s ap-
proach. I will content myself with differentiating it from two main fields, traditional sociology of science 
and social constructivism. Even these will be treated here in a rather schematic way, since my intention 
here is not to give a full portrait of them, but just to highlight the peculiarity of Kuhn’s project.
Sociology of science aims at accounting for a large set of problems concerning the social structure 
of science. Among other things, it aims at understanding the historical context in which theories are 
inserted, the institutional structure of the scientific community, and the factors that restrict or encourage 
scientific activity. At the same time, the traditional sociology of science explicitly, particularly within the 
Mertonian school, refuses to deal with the production of knowledge tout court. As Merton (1970) claims, 
“specific discoveries and inventions belong to the internal history of science and are largely indepen-
dent of factors other than purely scientific” (p. 75).
For Kuhn, however, social patterns do explain part of the outcome of scientific activity. Not only do 
they explain why new theories are invented—something with which Merton would agree—, but they 
also explain, in part, why theories are accepted. This is possible because scientists’ education and per-
sonal experiences are what explain their use of values and, therefore, contribute to explain the choices 
they make. Thus, for Kuhn, the “social” is central to understanding the “epistemological.”
This could lead us to think that Kuhn’s proposal is a sort of radical form of social constructivism, 
aimed at determining the psychological and social factors that would establish scientists’ choices in 
place of epistemic considerations. Indeed, that is how his ideas were often interpreted. If epistemic 
considerations are not sufficient by themselves to produce agreement, then, it was thought, some sort 
of external factor was necessary to generate it. Apparently, agreement would be produced through 
non-epistemic forces that determine scientists’ decisions.
As I intended to show, Kuhn’s model of consensus formation does not dismiss epistemological 
considerations. On the contrary: for the most part, scientists choose theories based on epistemic values, 
even if the acquisition of values is dependent on social factors. Ultimately, it is the epistemic criteria that 
determine what theories scientists choose.
Surely, epistemic considerations are involved in the wave motion mechanism, through the use of 
values. But what about scientific pedagogy and the restructuring of the scientific field? In which sense 
are these mechanisms also epistemic?
First, as Wray (2005) explains, disciplinary change, and particularly specialization, may be itself the 
result of conceptual changes. Pursuing better cognitive tools, scientists may develop taxonomies that 
account for a narrower set of phenomena. More importantly, both scientific pedagogy and disciplinary 
change foster the consensus among scientists, producing as consequence a more homogenous and 
efficient community. By doing that, they permit science to achieve its ultimate epistemic goals of achiev-
ing a more comprehensive understanding of the natural world. Thus, scientific pedagogy and disci-
plinary change are the subject of a social epistemology because they explain the epistemic success of 
science, and not only external or accidental aspects of scientific development.
For Kuhn, these socio-epistemic mechanisms are useful instruments for generating scientific knowl-
edge. According to him, the social structure of scientific research “provides a virtual guarantee that 
both the list of problems solved by science and the precision of individual problem-solutions will grow 
and grow” (1962, p. 170). By permitting dissent while at the same time stimulating agreement, scientific 
communities can create and explore new theories and select the ones they think are most fruitful. Con-
versely, a community that did not allow disagreement would not be able to explore multiple investiga-
tive paths simultaneously. 
This, in sum, is why Kuhn’s approach may be classified not only as sociology, but as social epis-
temology. For Kuhn, consensus is formed through a set of socio-epistemic mechanisms—patterns of 
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interactions among individuals which have a direct impact on how scientists evaluate theories, on how 
fast evidence is produced and spread, and on how the organization of research fields is established. 
Together, they enable us to explain the production and growth of scientific knowledge. As Kuhn once 
said, his work is “deeply sociological, but not in a way that permits that subject to be separated from 
epistemology” (1977b, p. xx; see also 1983b, p. 28).
Another aspect to be considered has to do with the normative character of Kuhn’s social epistemol-
ogy. The socio-epistemic mechanisms can explain why a scientific community abandons an older theory 
and accepts a new one, but do they say anything about the outcome of such change—i.e., does the 
new consensus represent an overall improvement of the epistemic situation of the scientific community? 
The answer, I believe, is “no.” Kuhn’s social epistemology gives an explanation of what leads a com-
munity into abandoning an older theory and to adopt a new one, but offers no justification of theoretical 
changes. Given that scientists choose theories mostly for epistemic reasons, we may assume that the newer 
theory is deemed an improvement by the majority of the scientific community (or to a part of it, since com-
munities can always split and reorganize). Strictly speaking, though, nothing can be said regarding the result 
of the theory change in itself—that is, apart from specific applications of epistemic values. We can only say 
that scientists achieved what, from their own standpoint, was seen as a better epistemic position.
This may sound as a serious limitation to Kuhn’s project, but I take it as an inevitable byproduct of 
a larger methodological transformation advanced by him. By claiming that the appreciation of theories 
is dependent on scientists’ idiosyncratic features, and that these may vary from person to person, Kuhn 
is discarding the idea that we can judge the improvement represented by a new theory regardless of 
specific interpretations of values. Instead, Kuhn wants us to consider changes of theories as sociological 
events which alter the distribution of beliefs of scientists and the structure of the community itself. In 
place of an individual epistemology, Kuhn is offering a social epistemology—one that asks “Why was 
a theoretical change seen as an improvement to the scientists in a community?”, instead of “Was that 
change of theory an actual improvement?”.
Kuhn’s explanations on the resolution of scientific controversies do not offer a precise and detailed 
model of how these events occur. But they are useful in that they provide a general perspective through 
which consensus is achieved, not through the universal application of a set of rules, but through so-
cial-epistemic mechanisms. That is also what links Kuhn’s social epistemology with many problems that 
have recently been considered by other scholars in the field.
For example, the fact that scientists offer arguments to convince their peers, and that this may 
change the distribution of preferences in the community, does not address the fact that individual 
scientists may attribute distinct weights to arguments and evidence depending on who provided 
that information. How do scientists incorporate the opinions and information given by members 
with different status? What makes someone an authority in a particular field? And what are the 
social indexes of competent knowledge; how do researchers identify these authorities? The epis-
temology of testimony provides an essential ingredient to understand the positions and roles of 
individuals in controversies.
Also, as regards the social interactions which influence scientists’ knowledge and choices, we may 
ask about conflicts that arise from divergence of opinions. What do scientists do when they face dis-
agreement between equally competent researchers? Do they slightly change their opinion, do they 
embrace that position instead, or do they stay in a position of disbelief? And, also, how should they act? 
The epistemology of disagreement, then, leads us to questions on normative social epistemology. 
What kind of community is more appropriate to produce a divergence that is sufficient to generate 
alternative approaches, and not lose its collaborative practice? How can scientists be trained to be 
both traditionalists and iconoclasts (Kuhn, 1959)? Those are some of the questions that connect Kuhn’s 
thought to the recent developments in the contemporary field of social epistemology. 
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